Masters of the Channel Night: The 10th Destroyer Flotilla’s Victory Off Ile De Batz, 9 June 1944

It was a dark and somewhat stormy night. In the western English Channel, off the Ile de Batz, twelve destroyers, eight Allied (including two Canadian) and four German, hurtled towards each other at a combined speed of 47 knots. Radar, penetrating the black murk ahead of the Allied ships, detected hostile contacts at ten miles range and the force deployed for action. Minutes later they opened devastating fire upon a startled enemy. The battle that ensued on the night of 9 June 1944 was the raison d’etre of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla, a destroyer strike force based on Plymouth. When planning the Normandy invasion Allied naval commanders recognized that although Kriegsmarine surface forces represented only a limited threat to the beachhead, powerful destroyers based in Bay of Biscay ports could wreak havoc on vulnerable build-up convoys crossing the Channel. But, because of the dominance of Allied air power, enemy destroyers came out only in the hours of darkness. Therefore, to win control of the western Channel, the 10th DF had to master the difficult art of night fighting

Confronting Technological and Tactical Change: Allied Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Last Year of the Battle for the Atlantic

The recall of German U-boat wolfpacks from the central north Atlantic at the end of May 1943 ended the most costly phase of the shipping war for the Allies. Never again would the German U-boats inflict dangerously high shipping losses. The naval war remained bitter, nonetheless, for the U-boats refused to give up, turning instead to new technology and new tactics. Right to the end, they continued to present a plausible threat that caused concern in high Allied circles. Indeed, in January 1945 the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty was moved to warn that, “The high shipping losses which may occur during the first half of 1945 may well prejudice the maintenance of our forces in Europe....” The ensuing struggle in early 1945 led to a confrontation and tactical changes by the U-boats countered by operational and tactical adaptation produced in reply by Allied anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces. This last phase of the battle of the Atlantic was fought out for the most part in the confusing and difficult shallow waters around the coasts of the United Kingdom and off the east coast of Canada, moving to the shores of the United States only in the last few months of the war. This campaign provides insights into how new and unexpected initiatives by an enemy could be dealt with even when no technological solutions were readily at hand. It also illustrates the difficulty that both submarine and antisubmarine forces encounter when operating in the challenging environment of shallow water

Physical and moral forces: An analysis of World War II’s 1944-1945 Ardennes offensive using Clausewitzian Theory

This thesis employs Carl von Clausewitz’s theory on moral forces to conduct an analysis of World War II’s 1944-1945 Ardennes Offensive. The literature largely focuses on presenting the physical components of the offensive, neglecting the moral. This thesis aims to fill this gap by presenting an analysis of the utilisation and effects of both physical and moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive and determining the importance of each to the outcome. Analysing the planning and execution of the offensive through this theoretical perspective reveals that moral forces played a significant part in Allied success in the Ardennes. The analysis exposed the German reliance on physical superiority yet failure to adjust initial plans to the geographical conditions in the area, in part due to Adolf Hitler’s total control of the armed forces. Following the offensive’s commencement, Allied military leadership demonstrated intuitive thought, good judgment, and determination resulting in swift defense of the area. German Forces were unable to break through this defense despite their great physical advantage. The analysis suggests that Allied moral forces greatly contributed to this initial defense, utilising psychological strength until the physical forces were able to be brought up to equal strength. As a reinterpretation of the Ardennes Offensive, this thesis contributes to the historical studies on battles of World War II and demonstrates the importance of moral forces in warfar

Freeing France: The Allies, the Résistance, and the JEDBURGHs

General Dwight D. Eisenhower used the Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur to conduct a guerilla war against German forces during the Allied campaigns in France. The study below examines the Allied politics, the nature and the development of the French Résistance, and the actions of the German forces in France to evaluate how useful the deployment of 93 JEDBURGH teams were in their role to conduct an effective guerilla war aiding Allied military objectives. Disagreements between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and resistance leader General Charles de Gaulle led to Eisenhower's inability to get the most out of the effort. Under certain conditions, Eisenhower and the French with British and American support achieved limited success. Eisenhower's recognition of de Gaulle's authority over the Résistance and his insistence on placing a French commander in charge of the effort proved to be the single greatest factor in the successes gained with the JEDBURGHs

Perceptions of Colonial North Africa during the Tunisia Campaign (1942-3)

This paper analyses differential views, approaches and reactions by the Anglo-American Allies to the conditions of (co )existence of the military personnel and civilians of diverse nationalities, encountered during the 1942-3 Allied invasion of Tunisia: Tunisian Arabs, French and other European settlers, as well as the various nationalities among the fighting parties on the ground. It discusses perceptions and representations on the part of members of the Allied forces following episodes of interaction, as gathered from campaign records. It focuses on the interactions between communities as witnessed by the Allied forces - including the Free French Forces - and between the communities and the forces themselves. Issues raised centre around the following themes: tensions and collusions; perceptions of the French colonised ‘Orient’; and first ripples of decolonisation, brought into the open on the occasion of the shock to the collective system arising from military invasion. The central thesis is that according to these testimonies, British servicemen on the ground, unlike American personnel, had yet to take on board the inevitability of a future postcolonial order in that part of the world. These perceptions and assessments of the situation are examined on the basis of evidence taken from the campaign archives: log books, memoirs and diaries, photographs and sketches, circulars and private correspondence etc. held in the Imperial War Museum in London and in the Memorial Leclerc in Paris

“One More for Luck”: The Destruction of U971 by HMCS Haida and HMS Eskimo, 24 June 1944

On the evening of 23 June 1944, HMCS Haida and HMS Eskimo set out from Plymouth, operational base of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla (10th DF), to conduct a sweep of the Western Approaches to the English Channel. Their role was to assist in securing these waters for the ongoing delivery of supplies and reinforcements to the Normandy bridgehead. Across the Channel to the southest, American, British and Canadian forces were now in their third week of fighting across the fields and hedgerows of Normandy. Operation OVERLORD had been the largest amphibious invasion in history and, dependent as it was on the unimpeded use of the sea, required an intensive concentration of air and naval forces to protect Allied supply convoys. This naval counterpart of OVERLORD was Operation NEPTUNE, and it was as part of this massive undertaken that Haida and Eskimo now steamed out of Plymouth

Stepping in New Directions: The Canadian Army’s Observer Program in the Asia-Pacific Region, 1944-45

In early 1944, and in anticipation of a government decision to commit ground forces to the war against Japan, the Canadian army launched a program that sent officers to the Asia-Pacific region to observe Allied operations. The observer program was well underway when, in November 1944, the Canadian government ordered the army to prepare a division to serve under American command in the Pacific theatre. The observer program helped the army deal with two significant challenges: learning how to fight a largely unfamiliar enemy in a tropical environment, and learning how to operate as part of an American force

Air Operations at Dieppe: An After-Action Report

Editor’s Introduction: The ill-fated action at Dieppe in August 1942 is most often remembered for the heavy casualties suffered by the Canadian land forces deployed in the assault and the political controversy that followed this ’military debacle.’ Lingering doubts over the rationale for the raid, and persistent statements that lives were lost in vain, continue to this day. But the Dieppe Raid was much more than casualties and questionable military decision making. It had immediate and valuable implications on the planning and conduct of future Allied amphibious operations, particularly the D-Day landings on 6 June 1944

The Canadian Attack at Amiens, 8–11 August 1918

By mid-1918, the character of the First World War had changed completely from the relatively static previous three years of battle. In March, the Germans had launched their desperate gamble to win the war in a single massive offensive and had been halted, at great cost to both sides, by June. On 18 July the French, aided by American forces, launched their highly successful counter-attack at Soissons and demonstrated that the German forces were far weaker t h a n the previous year. The opportunity was ripe to strike quickly and in force. This occurred at 4:20 a.m. on the 8th of August when the Battle of Amiens opened with the resounding crash of the combined artillery of two armies. One of the most powerful Allied forces ever assembled during the Great War, consisting of the French First (Debeney) and British Fourth (Rawlinson) Armies strengthened by the Canadian Corps and the entire British Cavalry and Tank Corps, rushed forward and fell upon the first line of generally ill-prepared and heavily outmatched Germans just east of the important railway centre at Amiens

Out from the shadows: the case for external oversight of UK special forces

While the UK government maintains a strict ‘no comment’ policy about the country’s special forces, allied countries, including the US, allow for parliamentary oversight of their covert military operations. Liam Walpole argues that the UK’s approach lacks democratic accountability and prevents proper evaluation of the military effectiveness of special forces. Options for reform include expanding the Intelligence and Security Committee’s remit to cover special forces